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These two books raise serious questions about various 
aspects of modern evolutionary theory. Do mind and 
consciousness have a material basis? Could conscious-
ness, conceptual thought or morality evolve by natural 
selection? Could physico-chemical processes account for 
the origin of life? What can natural selection of “random” 
mutation do? These books do not advocate creation-
ism or “intelligent design” or exaggerate the difference 
between humanity and other animals. They raise ques-
tions that evolutionary theory poses many humanists 
of good will, questions widely enough shared to deserve 
serious attention. Do their questions reflect a failure of 
we evolutionary biologists to communicate effectively, or 
real flaws in our message?
Thomas Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos, published when he 
was 75, argues (p. 4) that “psychophysical reductionism, 
a position in the philosophy of mind that is largely moti-
vated by the hope of showing how the physical sciences 
could in principle provide a theory of everything,” has 
failed. He asserts (p. 9) that the reductionist account of 
life faces “problems of probability… both with respect to 
the evolution of life forms through accidental mutation 
and natural selection and with respect to the formation 
from dead matter of physical systems capable of such 
evolution. The more we learn about the intricacy of the 
genetic code and its control over the chemical processes 
of life, the harder these problems seem.” Although I disa-
gree with Nagel’s major theses, his book has forced me to 
think about many topics, and I am most grateful that he 
wrote it. Indeed, answering these questions should help 
bring the sciences and the humanities closer together.
Nagel does not appreciate what natural selection can 
do. On p. 94 he claims that assuming “accidental muta-
tions provided the set of successive candidates on which 
natural selection operated to generate the history of life” 
makes “the outcome too accidental to count as a genuine 
explanation of the existence of conscious, thinking beings 
as such.” Fisher (1930, p. 37) said of such arguments “The 
income derived from a Casino by its proprietor may, in 
one sense, be said to depend on a succession of favour-
able chances, although the phrase contains a sugges-
tion of improbability more appropriate to the hopes of 
the patrons of his establishment. It is easy… to perceive 
the difference between a succession of favourable devia-
tions from the laws of chance, and… the continuous and 
cumulative action of those laws. It is on the latter that 
the principle of Natural Selection depends.” Nagel (p. 
10) cites Michael Behe’s (1996) Darwin’s Black Box, with 
approval, not because he accepts intelligent design, but 
because he believes Behe points out seemingly insuper-
able difficulties in selection theory. He does not directly 
cite Behe’s “irreducible complexity” argument, but I pre-
sume he, like Behe, rejects the idea that complex adapta-
tions can evolve by steps so small or simple that each step 
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could occur as a chance mutation. I will return to this 
issue later.
Nagel feels on much surer ground in rejecting the ori-
gin of life as a purely physico-chemical process. If he is 
right, Putnam (1992, p. 33) is just to assert “evolution 
will not give you any more intentionality than you pack 
into it.” Recent work on sea-bottom alkaline vents (Lane 
2015), however, may overthrow Nagel’s view. In these 
structures, molecular hydrogen vented in water from the 
magma below meets the carbon dioxide in the oceans, 
providing a steady energy supply, and an ever-renewing 
stock of bacteria-sized bubbles with semipermeable walls 
of iron sulphide, studded with catalytic compounds of 
iron, nickel and sulphur. In alkaline vents, chemical reac-
tions can form organic compounds needed for life’s ori-
gin. These vents provide a place where steps toward the 
origin of life can occur one after another rather than all 
at once. The issue of how life began is far from settled, 
but if, as seems increasingly likely, self-replicating entities 
can emerge from purposeless chemical reactions, selec-
tion would soon transform these entities into beings that 
intend to do what is needed to survive and reproduce.
Nagel (p. 35) believes that consciousness is the biggest 
obstacle to a naturalism based only on physical science, 
declaring (p. 71) “Consciousness presents a problem for 
evolutionary reductionism because of its irreducibly 
subjective character.” Consciousness is a mystery: even 
now, explaining it in terms of physics and chemistry is 
hardly more than a hope. The mathematical physicist 
H. Weyl (2009, p. 197) illustrates the limits of science by 
the “riddle posed by the double nature of the ego… On 
the one hand, I am a real individual man… carrying out 
real physical and psychical acts. On the other hand, I am 
‘vision’ open to reason, a self-penetrating light, imma-
nent sense-giving consciousness…” In his greatest book, 
the ethologist Konrad Lorenz (1978, p. 169) remarked 
on “that most mysterious of barriers, utterly impenetra-
ble to human understanding, that runs through the mid-
dle of the undeniable one-ness of our personality—the 
barrier that divides our subjective experience from the 
objective, verifiable physiological events that occur in 
our body.” Lorenz (1978, p. 170) asserted “The autonomy 
of personal experience and its laws cannot in princi-
ple be explained in terms of physical and chemical laws 
or of neuro-physiological structure, however complex.” 
Jacques Monod (1971, p. 159), who was far more inter-
ested in evolution and behavior than his fellow molecular 
biologists, remarked that consciousness is a “frontier, still 
almost as impassable for us as it was for Descartes… We 
today are no less in the habit of differentiating brain from 
mind than they were in the eighteenth century. Objec-
tive analysis obliges us to see that this seeming duality 
within us is a delusion. But it is… so intimately rooted in 
our being, that nothing could be vainer than to hope to 
dissipate it in the immediate awareness of subjectivity, or 
to learn to live emotionally and morally without it.” (The 
phrase “objective analysis” should give Mary Midgley a 
good laugh). More recently, Changeux (2008) has been 
investigating the neurobiology of consciousness. Con-
sciousness is so firmly rooted in the brain, and so essen-
tial to its possessors, that natural selection must be able 
to shape it. Many subjective experiences, like pain, have 
objectively observable neurobiological correlates, a cir-
cumstance that gives me but not Nagel (p. 38–41), hope 
that we may eventually have some objective understand-
ing of consciousness. Nonetheless, Changeux (2008, p. 
19, my translation) confesses “To be sure, in spite of all 
these discoveries, all these advances, we have as yet only 
babblings about the neuroscience of consciousness…”
Nagel also believes that natural selection cannot 
explain our ability to know objectively and reason effec-
tively. He is rightly revolted (p. 80–81) by the idea that 
natural selection is needed to validate our norms of 
thought, reason and morality. In the world of everyday 
affairs, there is only one set of rules for sound thought 
(If A implies B and B implies C, then A implies C; if A 
is true, not A is false, &c) which Aristotle codified long 
ago. The circumstance that natural selection would favor 
incorporating these rules, however unconsciously, in the 
thought of some animals has nothing to do with validat-
ing these rules.
Nagel thinks that whereas “Thought and reasoning are 
correct or incorrect in virtue of something independent 
of the thinker’s beliefs, and even independent of the com-
munity of thinkers to which he belongs” (p. 72), animals’ 
“lives are lived in the world of appearances, and the idea 
of an objective reality has no meaning” (p. 73) and that 
the capacity of human thought to “transcend subjectiv-
ity and to discover what is objectively the case” (p. 72) 
renders human thought and reasoning inexplicable by 
natural selection. Many agree with him, including the 
physicist Stephen Barr (2011) and a philosopher with no 
interest in creationism or intelligent design, Hilary Put-
nam (1992).
This view, however, must be wrong. First, as Lorenz 
(p. 24) observes, natural selection of random mutation, 
retaining only what works best, parallels the acquisition 
of objective knowledge by a human being who compares 
“an idea in his mind, a hypothesis he has evolved, with 
the outside world and ‘checks whether it fits.’” The knowl-
edge encoded in an organism’s genome of how to procure 
sufficient resources from its habitat to grow, survive and 
reproduce is as objective as the knowledge a scientist 
gains by trial and error—testing a hypothesis, modifying 
it as needed, and testing it again. Similarly, unconscious 
computations in human or monkey eyes abstract the 
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existence, shape and color of an object from an array of 
subjective sense impressions (Lorenz 1978, p. 11). Weyl 
(2009, p. 199) and Lorenz (p. 11) both remark how these 
unconscious operations by which we (like other verte-
brates) infer a body as the common cause of its various 
perspective views amount to inferring objectively exist-
ing entities from subjective sense impressions. Indeed, 
Weyl emphasizes the analogy between these unconscious 
operations and the conscious operations by which physi-
cists infer the existence of molecules, atoms or electrons. 
If monkeys and cats can unconsciously ascend from sub-
jective data to objective conclusions, why must their con-
sciousness be restricted to the subjective?
Second, the theory of mind, by which one chimpan-
zee infers the motives, intentions or feelings of another, 
depends on applying an analogy. As Adam Smith (1759, 
section I. I. 2) remarked, “As we have no immediate expe-
rience of how other men feel, we can form no idea of the 
manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving 
what we ourselves would feel in the same situation.” The 
same is true for chimpanzees. Analogy is also a powerful 
tool in forming theories (Thompson 1942, p. 9n).
Third, primate social life favors intelligence (Jolly 1966). 
Baboons live in troops of eighty. Each troop has a domi-
nance hierarchy governing access to mates and food or 
resting sites. A baboon’s failure to know its rank in the 
hierarchy can earn a severe beating; consistent failure 
may keep it from reproducing. A baboon can recognize, 
by sight or sound, every other troop-mate. From what a 
baboon sees and hears of the interactions among its fel-
low troop members it unconsciously infers the domi-
nance hierarchy and the matrilineal kinship network 
(who is whose mother, maternal sibling, &c) of the whole 
troop (Cheney and Seyfarth 2007, p. 14, 108). Indeed, 
Cheney and Seyfarth (p. 15, 109) believe that “natural 
selection has led to the evolution of a mind innately pre-
disposed to search for the patterns and rules that underlie 
other baboons’ behavior,” just as children’s brains are pre-
disposed to language learning. This abstract, elaborate, 
objective, often tested theoretical construct provides an 
economical summary of the social knowledge a baboon 
needs to survive and reproduce (Cheney and Seyfarth 
2007, p. 118).
Objective inference, reasoning by analogy, and infer-
ring, however unconsciously, theoretical constructs that 
economically summarize social knowledge, all enhance 
their possessor’s fitness. Ritualized games using these 
abilities, such as poetry, drama, mathematics and theo-
retical physics, are a form of social play, an outgrowth of 
the exploratory curiosity so common in many animals 
(Huizinga 1950; Lorenz 1978). “What is new in explora-
tory behavior [of animals] is only that the motivation is 
furnished by the learning process itself,” not by satisfying 
a particular need. “As a result of this apparently small 
step forward there emerges an entirely new cognitive 
process… in essence identical to that of human investi-
gation and which leads without an essential break to the 
activity of scientific research. The connection between 
play and investigation… is still fully preserved in adult 
human investigation” (Lorenz 1978, p. 149). Are philoso-
phers too serious to see how important play is for devel-
oping intellect?
Indeed, even if animals other than human beings can-
not criticize each other except by punishing, out-repro-
ducing or eating the mistaken, they must live in the 
same objectively real world we do. They must also infer 
objective truths—the presence of predators, whether a 
brightly colored animal is advertising its distastefulness 
by “warning colors” or a tasty mimic of such a distasteful 
animal, whether an object is an inedible stick or an edi-
ble walking stick, detectable by its head and paired legs 
(Ziegler and Leigh 2012, p. 175–195). There are no surro-
gate truths: what they know, they must know truly (Lor-
enz 1978). Weyl (1949, p. 153) quoted Einstein’s remark 
“Nobody who really goes into the matter will deny that 
the world of perception determines the theoretical sys-
tem in a virtually unambiguous manner, although no log-
ical way leads to the principles of the theory” (Weyl 1949, 
p. 153). Likewise, Dennett (2015, p. 175) remarked that, 
although in theory two anthropologists studying a newly 
contacted tribe with a totally unknown language could 
construct different but equally justifiable dictionaries for 
this language, it would be almost impossible to provide 
an example.
Finally, Nagel (p. 107) accepts an argument of Sharon 
Street that “if the responses and faculties that generate 
our value judgments are… the result of natural selec-
tion, there is no reason to expect that they would lead 
us to be able to detect any mind-independent moral or 
evaluative truth.” As he believes there are objective moral 
truths, he concludes that natural selection cannot be the 
only “director” of evolution. C. S. Lewis (1947, chapter 2) 
argued for a unique objective substrate underlying the 
world’s moral systems, which he called the Tao. Although 
we have yet to fully discern this Tao (Lewis 1947, p. 30), 
it can be approximated by Exodus 20: 10–17 and sum-
marized by the demands that we treat others as, in their 
shoes, we would be treated and that we punish those 
who violate these norms (Darwin 1871; Ricoeur 1989; 
Changeux 2008, p. 44). There may well be only one set 
of basic moral rules that ensure a healthy, sustainable 
social life. Moreover, perturbing the balance of virtues 
prescribed by this Tao, exaggerating some and neglect-
ing others, causes massive social suffering (Lewis 1947, p. 
29). These virtues may be related to each other by relat-
ing them to Plato’s idea of the Good (Murdoch 1971, ch. 
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3). Can natural selection predispose us to discover these 
rules?
First, I suggest that interdependence is the real mother 
of morality. An animal’s genes are utterly dependent 
on each other’s correct function. Thanks to the blind 
mechanism of natural selection, mindless genes com-
munally enforce a rule of fair competition ensuring that 
genes spread only if they benefit their bearers, thereby 
serving their fellow genes’ common good. An animal’s 
cells are diploid, carrying two sets of the genes encod-
ing the recipe for its growth, survival and reproduction. 
When it reproduces, it produces haploid gametes, eggs 
or sperm, with one set of genes apiece. At almost every 
locus, a gamete has equal chance of receiving its grand-
mother’s or its grandfather’s gene, the choice normally 
being governed by the fairest lottery in all nature. Very 
rarely, a mutant gene arises that biases this lottery in its 
own favor by killing most of the “normal” sperm, so that 
95 % of the surviving sperm of an adult male with a sin-
gle copy of this mutant inherit this mutant. This mutant 
thus spreads rapidly at first. In homozygous individuals 
with two mutant genes at this locus, mutants are equally 
nasty to each other. Genes at different loci are so interde-
pendent that when this locus fails to function thanks to 
having two mutant genes, the animal is stillborn or ster-
ile. Because genes on different chromosomes assort inde-
pendently of genes at this “distorter” mutant’s locus, none 
of them can spread by “riding the distorter’s coattails.” 
Because the distorter kills its homozygotes, a mutant 
on another chromosome that restores the lottery’s fair-
ness will out-reproduce its fellows by sparing some of its 
descendants the death they would otherwise have suf-
fered from this distorter’s spread. In short, this lottery’s 
fairness is enforced by a selection that favors the com-
mon good of the animal’s genes. Similarly, injustice tends 
to destroy society, so punishing injustice and enforcing 
fairness serves the common good of a society’s mem-
bers (Smith 1790, part II, section ii, chapter 3, paragraph 
8). Moreover, fair competition usually benefits society 
(Smith 1776). Curiously, mechanistic selection among 
genes has done far better than human beings of modern 
societies in making competition fair.
In sentient animals, interdependence also breeds moral 
instincts. In Book I, 351c of his Republic, Plato observed 
that a gang of thieves only functions effectively if they 
treat each other fairly. In hunter-gatherer societies, which 
tend to have roughly thirty members apiece, each mem-
ber’s survival depends on the willing cooperation of all 
the others. Their unity of purpose depends on treating 
each other fairly and punishing the unfair (Boehm 2012). 
“No tribe could hold together if murder, robbery, treach-
ery, &c., were common; consequently such crimes within 
the limits of the same tribe ‘are branded with everlasting 
infamy.’” (Darwin 1871, p. 93). Similarly, “All animals liv-
ing in a body which defend each other or attack their 
enemies in concert, must be in some degree faithful to 
each other” (Darwin 1871, p. 78f ). Moreover “actions are 
regarded by savages, and were probably so regarded by 
primeval man, solely as they affect in an obvious manner 
the welfare of the tribe,—not that of the species, nor that 
of… an individual member” (Darwin 1871, p. 96). Darwin 
therefore concluded that the moral sense evolved from 
the social instincts, both originally serving the tribe’s 
good. Thus courage, self-sacrifice, self-control and fidel-
ity were prized, but the weak might be expelled to enable 
the tribe’s survival (Darwin 1871, p. 96, 77). Since social 
instincts evolved for the tribe’s good, sympathy was nor-
mally confined to its members (Darwin 1871, p. 93–94, 
97), just as social animals normally extend services only 
to fellow group members (Darwin 1871, p. 72).
In tribal life, as in the life of social animals, the response 
to another’s needs must often be quick. Such responses 
cannot wait for conscious calculation, they must be 
rooted in instinctive sympathy for fellow group mem-
bers. These instincts are deeply rooted: long before it rea-
sons, a baby, like a playing dog or wolf, will cease a form 
of play that elicits distress in a companion (Changeux 
2008, p. 52), a phenomenon known as “violence inhibi-
tion.” Such fellow-feeling should keep one from impos-
ing serious harm on a fellow group member to procure 
a slight benefit for oneself, a phenomenon Nagel (p. 100) 
thought inexplicable by natural selection. Indeed, in a 
small, tightly interdependent group one cannot afford the 
luxury of asking “Why should I be the one to sacrifice my 
life for the group?” for taking time to ask could kill one’s 
whole group.
By themselves, social instincts do not a morality make. 
Reason must judge between conflicting instincts (Lewis 
1947, p. 23). Darwin (1871, p. 106) argued that “the social 
instincts—the prime principles of man’s moral constitu-
tion—with the aid of active intellectual powers and the 
effects of habit, naturally lead to the golden rule, ‘As ye 
would that man should do unto you, do ye to them like-
wise;’ and this lies at the foundation of morality.” As small 
tribes are united into larger communities, reason should 
tell each person to extend the golden rule, first to all 
members of his nation, then to all human beings (Darwin 
1871, p. 100). This is still a work in progress. As society 
enlarges and interdependence within families and local 
groups weakens, social instincts weaken also weaken, and 
reason must take over from natural selection in promot-
ing morality. Nowadays, reasoned morality is often sup-
planted by cruder instincts.
The tragedy of Nagel’s thought-provoking, stimulat-
ing book is, as he realizes, its lack of convincing alter-
natives to materialism. Nagel seeks special features of 
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matter that make it possible for consciousness to evolve, 
but isn’t this just expanding our understanding of mat-
ter? Lacking other approaches, biologists will push the 
materialist approach as far as they can. The best of them, 
like Changeux (2008), will seek full explanations of con-
sciousness, learning and moral judgment. Nagel wonders 
whether a teleology inherent in nature, such as Aristot-
le’s, unconnected with any god (Gilson 1971) will explain 
the origin of life and evolution of adaptation. Because 
selection promotes the common good of autosomal 
genomes, selection-theory, however, makes far more spe-
cific predictions than Aristotelean teleology ever could 
about phenomena such as kin selection, the maintenance 
of fair meiosis against challenges from “distorter” alleles, 
sex ratio at birth, and the like.
Mary Midgley’s Are You an Illusion?, written when she 
was 94, was triggered (p. 5) by an outrageous claim by 
Francis Crick of DNA fame: “You, your joys and sorrows, 
your memories and your ambitions, your sense of per-
sonal identity and your free-will, are in fact no more than 
the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve-cells and their 
attendant molecules.” She is a philosopher whose first 
book, Beast and Man (Midgley 1978), was a remarkably 
balanced critique of E. O. Wilson’s (1975) bitterly con-
troversial Sociobiology. She followed this by Animals and 
Why They Matter (Midgley 1983), a well-written, clearly 
reasoned assessment of human duties toward animals. 
Her writings abound in the plain horse sense so charac-
teristic of Aristotle and Darwin, and so sorely lacking in 
many modern academics. In this book, she criticizes var-
ious aspects of neo-Darwinism and the world-view she 
thinks it reflects, mostly for what it ignores.
First, she is revolted by certain “nothing-but” reduc-
tionisms associated with this world-view, such as Crick’s 
remark, just quoted. We are in fact functional beings 
whose nerve-cells can do nothing without our bodies: 
why replace a perfectly good functional explanation by a 
promised mechanical explanation whose fulfillment no 
one can yet guarantee, and which, if fulfilled, would prob-
ably be much less insightful?
Second, the materialistic world-view underlying neo-
Darwinian writings often privileges the objective over 
the subjective, ignoring mind, intention and conscious-
ness as immune to objective analysis, and too immate-
rial to affect the material world. She delights (p. 73–75) 
in haling forth sexual selection as visible evidence of how 
female intentions and aesthetic preferences can drive 
evolution: Dawkins (2009, p. 45–54) discussed the ways 
flowers attract pollinators to illustrate the power of nat-
ural selection driven by animal choice. Indeed, ignoring 
what our consciousness can tell us is crippling, as the 
materialist Jacques Monod (1971, p. 159) recognized. The 
mathematician and theoretical physicist Hermann Weyl 
(1949, p. 283) remarked “Scientists would be wrong to 
ignore the fact that [objective] theoretical construction is 
not the only approach to the phenomena of life; another 
way, that of [subjective] understanding from within 
(interpretation) is open to us… Its illuminating light 
is directed not only on my fellow man: it also reaches, 
although with ever-increasing dimness and incertitude, 
deeply into the animal kingdom.” Any ethologist knows 
the importance of “trying to put herself in her study ani-
mal’s shoes”: Midgley (p. 17–20, 31) shows how failure to 
take into account the intentions and emotions of animals 
stunted the study of animal behavior. About six pages 
into The Secret of Father Brown, G. K. Chesterton (1951, 
p. 639) reveals both the moral and the cognitive damage 
from ignoring our understanding from within:
"What do these men mean… when… they say 
criminology is a science? They mean getting out-
side a man, and studying him as if he were a gigan-
tic insect; in what they would call a dry impartial 
light; in what I should call a dead and dehumanized 
light… I don’t deny that the dry light may sometimes 
do good, though in one sense… far from being knowl-
edge, it’s actually suppression of what we know. It’s 
like treating a friend as a stranger… [Instead] I try 
to get inside the murderer… I am inside a man. I am 
always inside a man… but I wait until I am inside 
a murderer, thinking his thoughts, wrestling with his 
passions, till I have bent myself into the posture of 
his… hatred.”
Privileging the objective over the subjective has also 
led to divorcing fact from value and reason from emotion 
and feeling, even though the crucial role of aesthetics in 
Einstein’s general theory of relativity belies the first, and 
the second claim flies in the face of modern, deliberately 
materialistic neurobiology (Damasio 2003). Moreover, 
these divorces have privileged science over the arts and 
promoted science as the only way of knowing, which has 
done nothing to enhance either the effectiveness of edu-
cation or the quality of its content (Nussbaum 2010).
Third, Midgley doubts whether biology can be reduced 
to physics and chemistry. Like Changeux (2008), she real-
izes that the philosophy of matter needs updating (p. 88): 
Aristotle’s concept of matter, still unreflectively assumed 
by many humanists, is vastly oversimplified (Weyl 1949). 
Nonetheless, she doubts whether mind can be explained 
entirely in terms of matter. The laws of physics are the 
same whether run forward or backward (p. 136), whereas 
our own lives, the evolution and diversification of living 
things, the history of the universe, and the second law 
of thermodynamics are all characterized by a direction 
in time (Prigogine 1997, Smolin 2013). Midgley won-
ders whether physics is too transfixed by the idea of an 
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“imagined, changeless, abstract, transcendent universe” 
(p. 138) to be the only foundation of biology. More gen-
erally, she believes that there are other ways of knowing 
besides science (p. 2): “But the way in which the universe 
works isn’t confined to the things that the sciences tell us 
about it.”
Fourth, Midgley considers it thoroughly inappropri-
ate to declare the universe meaningless in the name of 
atheistic materialism (p. 82, 85–89, as do Monod (1971) 
and Dawkins (1976). Like the agnostic Darwin (1969, p. 
92–93), she sees plenty of meaning in the story of our 
planet. Moreover, she is as hesitant as Darwin to try to 
destroy the meaning other people see in their lives.
Finally, she finds modern selection-theory problem-
atic. She doubts the “creativeness” of natural selection, 
which she considers merely a filter (p. 16, 71) rather than 
a continuing feedback where organisms produce varied 
offspring which are tested by the environment, of which 
the best survive to repeat the process (Lorenz 1978, pp. 
24, 27). She must believe that the true origin of species 
is more linked to the origin of variation than to natural 
selection. She remarks (p. 82): “The total reliance of natu-
ral selection on chance was simply not compatible with 
the notion of any fixed direction.” Artificial selection, 
however, which depends as much on “chance variation” 
as its natural sister, is often quite directional. Nor are the 
demands the environment makes on the practitioners of 
a given way of life more capricious than a human breed-
er’s demands. She doubts whether, even given adequate 
variation, natural selection can account for the exuberant 
variety of life, because (p. 77, 90) she cannot see how all 
the varied features of living beings are related to surviv-
ing in order to reproduce. She does not understand kin 
selection, which is curious, for its role in the evolution 
of insect societies seems obvious to most biologists. She 
has been unduly excoriated for this failure. She prefers to 
speak of group selection. Like Darwin (1871, p. 166) she 
believes, as I do (Leigh 2010), that group selection played 
a central role in the evolution of morality in hunter-gath-
erer tribes (Midgley 2010, p. 25–27). She does not under-
stand why the concept of group selection fell into such 
disrepute, which it always does when not formulated in a 
way that allows quantitative analysis.
Her greatest difficulty is with viewing natural selection 
as competition (p. 69), which it undoubtedly is. She asso-
ciates this view with Margaret Thatcher’s politics: does 
she think that competition always implies overt contest? 
She recalls (p. 65–66) an article whose authors, thinking 
that natural selection only favors individual advantage, 
puzzled over how language, which shares useful informa-
tion with others, could evolve. How could they fail to see 
that if members of a group can communicate in order to 
cooperate, they would all survive better? She despises the 
idea that genes are utterly selfish (p. 69–70, 82–83). After 
all, these genes are utterly interdependent because their 
organism can survive and pass them on to offspring only 
if nearly every gene in its genome does its job appropri-
ately. Thanks to their interdependence, selection on these 
selfish genes enforces a moral code that ensures that an 
allele only spreads by promoting its autosomal genome’s 
common good. Her rejection of competition is sad, for 
evolution, like Adam Smith’s (1776) economics, reflects 
the intimate interplay of competition and cooperation: 
neglect either, and gross misunderstanding results.
To summarize: Midgley’s book flags many misguided 
directions in biology. Although she knows and appreci-
ates Darwin’s work far better than most, this book is curi-
ously distrustful of natural selection. Does she conflate 
the gene- (or genome-) centered approach to evolution, 
which emphasizes kin selection, with Dawkins’s (1976) 
views (since moderated) on arrant gene selfishness? We 
evolutionary biologists must take care what spin we put 
on our explanations.
In sum, I do not know how consciousness works, or 
the likelihood of variation that would allow natural selec-
tion to bring forth moral instincts, objective knowledge 
and conceptual thought. Nonetheless, Darwin (1871) 
and Lorenz (1978) showed how consciousness, objec-
tive knowledge, conceptual thought and moral instincts 
enhance their possessors’ survival and reproduction. I 
also think that excessive eagerness to associate natural 
selection with selfishness—an error Darwin avoided—
has distorted reality in a way that creates unnecessary 
suspicion of science in general and evolutionary biology 
in particular.
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